Introduction
Weren't you worried the last time you typed your PIN (Personal Identi cation Number) to an unknown teller machine that it could be a fake and that its sole purpose could be to steal your PIN? According to a recent headline of the NY Times 26] maybe you should worry:
\One Less Thing to Believe In: Fraud at Fake Cash Machine"
The problem with current identi cation systems is that the customer must trust the equipment to which he types his PIN. It is completely trivial to modify a teller machine to memorize the PIN numbers that people type to it. PINs are meant to be checked, not given. (Consult 1] for an extensive study of frauds at teller machines.)
Of course, it is always possible to completely solve the problem of identication and authentication of messages by classical methods 9] that require exchanging passwords which length are proportional to the number of uses. Unfortunately, this is completely impractical: we want to rely on the existence of a short secret to check identity.
A similar approach has been suggested in a computational model through the construction of pseudo-random generators 7] or pseudo-random families of functions 17] which requires only short secrets seeds. These solutions make sense only in a context where we put computational restrictions on the participants. For powerful parties it is trivial to fake identities.
In the computational model, more sophisticated tools were developed for this purpose: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity 15] introduced in order to provide means by which an honest party may convince another party of his identity in a way that cannot be replayed successfully to another party. This is true even if the verifying party tries his best to extract valuable information out of the proving party. Moreover, a dishonest party attempting to prove an invalid identity will be detected by the verifying party except with vanishingly small probability.
Non-Computational Protocols
The major drawback with these proofs and other computational techniques is that deep down their security must rely on some computational assumption: the proof of knowledge can be checked if the identifying string is the solution to some hard public problem. If one can solve this problem, he can fake identities. This is the case even if we build the protocol from perfect cryptographic tools such as ideal Bit Commitment or ideal Oblivious Transfer.
In the current paper, we consider a situation where two parties, Alice and Bob, share a common secret string and would like to mutually check their knowledge of that string without disclosing it. This problem has been extensively studied by Fagin, Naor and Winkler 14] who provide a large number of scenarios where the problem may be considered. From the cryptographic point of view only one of their solutions may be considered secure: a solution based on the existence of a one-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer 13] which uses (n 2 ) Transfers to do the job for an n-bit secret string.
We describe a simple and e cient protocol based on the exchange of quantum information to check mutual knowledge of a common string in such a way that honest parties will always succeed in convincing each other (except with vanishingly small probability), while a dishonest party interacting with an honest party will have only vanishingly small probability of convincing him. Moreover, a dishonest party gains only a very small amount of information about the secret string from running the protocol: whoever enters the protocol with no knowledge of the secret string would have to enter this protocol an exponential number of times in order to gain non-negligible information about the string.
Our scheme, based on coding theory, depends on no computational assumption, has a total running time of O(n 2:376 ) and a total of O(n 2 ) photons are transmitted (if implemented with a one-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer, only O(n) such Transfers are necessary). We also present a scheme which uses only O(n) photons but that cannot tolerate the transmission errors of a real quantum channel. We suggest the reader consults 8] for more details of quantum cryptography.
We believe such a system should be used in smartcards to avoid frauds from typing PIN codes to dishonest teller machines. A PIN could still be used to activate the functions of the card but it should be typed directly to the card (a device you might as well trust since your bank gives it to you, and they have your money anyway!). The card would identify itself with tellers only through our mechanism: no PIN ever exchanged.
The practical di culty of our scheme is to embed the necessary technology for the Quantum Oblivious Transfer on a card. Since none of the technology is very fancy we believe such cards could be mass produced (see Section 4.6). information about can be modeled by a set = f (n) f0; 1g n g n>0 such that
Preliminaries
for some > 0 and all su ciently large n we have:
#f0; 1g n 1 ? 2 ? n and P ? (n) 6 2 (n) < 2 ? n and for each 0 2 (n) we have:
The Shannon information given by about is such that I( (n) j (n) ) 2 ?b n ; b > 0:
De nition2. These two properties are straightforward applications of the above de nitions.
Simple Quantum Transmission
In this paper we consider the most simple idealization of a quantum transmission. There is only four di erent ways to transmit photons corresponding to the four polarization angles 0 ;45 ;90 ;135 that we denote j$i; j% . i; jli; j& -i respectively. If Alice wants to send b 2 f0; 1g, she used the following encoding rules:
1. b = 0 is randomly encoded by j$i or j% . i. Suppose Alice and Bob share the same private sequence = A = B . This implies that, for any 0 > 0 and except with vanishingly small probability, Bob will decode b c as c which is at Hamming distance less than ( + 0 )n fromĉ given n su ciently large. Now consider a malicious Alice (denoted by Alice ) is trying to impersonate the real Alice. We assume that Alice knows almost nothing about B at the beginning. Therefore she will have roughly half the positions di erent from Bob and thus sends random bits in half the positions. It is easy to show that if the minimum distance d n of C n is such that d n > 2n( + 0 ), Alice will be detected with probability greater than 1 ? 2 ? n for > 0. By this attempt, she will not learn more than a vanishingly small amount of Shannon information about B .
3.1 ident( ; ) with a dishonest Bob Let 2 R f$ l ; % . & -g n be Alice's secret and let c be the transmitted random codeword taken from C n . Bob chooses a set of bases and measures each photon i in the basis i in order to obtain b c. Roughly speaking, one half of the bases of will match with the bases of . Thus approximatively half of the bits he will receive are the bits of the codeword sent by Alice. The other bits (the positions i for which i 6 = i ) are not correlated with the bits transmitted.
For Bob to be unable to determine a substantial amount of information about , the code must be chosen so that any half of the bits of the codewords are purely random. Hence, if the proportion of the bits Bob sees about a codeword is random and the rest of the bits he received are not correlated (thus random) the thing he gets is a purely random string. Given that the same would happend for all but a few almost no further information about can be determined.
A similar concept in a di erent setting was studied by 4], 24] ((n; j;k){ functions) and 10] (t{resilient functions). The next de nition is taken from 4].
De nition3 4]. For any integers n;j;k such that n j + k, j > 0 and k > 0, a function f : GF(Q) n ! GF(Q) j is (n; j;k) if, no matter how one xes any k of its inputs, each of the Q j outputs can be produced in exactly Q n?j?k di erent ways by varying the remaining n ? k symbols. If each symbol of f(x) is obtained by computing a weighted sum on a subset of the digits in x then f(x) is said to be xor-(n; j;k). In 4] the function f is from n{bit strings to j{bit strings, here we consider an arbitrary eld. The following theorem showing how to construct (n; j;k){functions, was originally proved for functions over binary strings. It is straightforward to generalize it to functions over arbitrary elds. Theorem4 4] . For a set of values (n; j;k), there exists an xor-(n; j;k)-function from GF(Q) n to GF(Q) j if and only if there exists an n;j;k + 1] linear codes C n over GF(Q).
If G is the generating matrix of a n;j;k + 1]-code C n then the function f(x) = Gx T (x T is x transposed) is xor ? (n; j;k). Saying that f is (n; j;k) implies that f ?1 (x) is a set which have uniform projection on any k coordinates 10]:
De nition5 10]. A set S GF(Q) n has a uniform projection on any j components if for all ! 2 f0; 1g n of weight j and all a 2 GF(Q) k , the set S !;a = fx 2 S : (?; x) !] = ag is such that #S !;a = #S Q k .
If f(x) = Gx T is (n; j;k) then f ?1 (x) = Hx T , where H is the parity check matrix for C n . The matrix H is also the generating matrix for the dual C ? n of C n . The next theorem makes the connection between uniform projections and some conditions on the dual of the codes C n . Theorem 6. If there exists a family of codes C = fC n g n>0 such that for n su ciently large the dual C ? n of C n has minimum distance d 0 n with d 0 n n > 1 2 , protocol ident( A ; ) hides almost all information about A to Bob except with probability exponentially small in n. This holds given an idealized quantum transmission.
proof sketch: By property 1, except with vanishingly small probability ( ; A ) (1 ? )n. Thus, the number of positions for which Bob sees the bits of c is less than n. Let H be the generating matrix for C ? n of minimum distance n. The function Hx T has uniform projection on any n components. Thus, any n bits of a codeword c (those for which Hc T = 0) are random when c 2 R C n . Since the other (1 ? )n positions are random, the stringĉ he received is purely random. Therefore, the set 1 = f j ( ; ) (1 ? )ng models the knowledge leaked to Bob by the actual execution of the protocol. It is easy to show that 1 gives almost no information about . Let 0 be the model for Bob 's knowledge about A before the actual execution. The set = 0 \ 1 models Bob 's knowledge after the current execution given he had almost no information when entering the protocol. By property 2 the set gives almost no information about A . For Bob executing poly(n) times the protocol, the set
where i models the information leaked about for the i th execution gives almost no information about A . We conclude that ident( A ; ) hides almost all information about A to Bob . u t
Code Properties
Over the last few sections we have suggested some conditions on our codes. Let us now summarize the properties that families of codes C must satisfy to guarantee the security of protocol ident( A ; B ) while preserving e ciency of the scheme.
1. Given our mode of transmission via the quantum channel, we want C to be a family of binary codes.
2. Each C n 2 C must be e ciently constructible and e ciently decodable. It is common in coding theory to take care of arbitrary long messages via block codes. These codes are of no help in our setting because their duals have small minimum distance. This is easy to see since it is su cient to observe a constant number of bits to tell if a word is a candidate codeword or not.
On top of these problems due to coding theory, more fundamental problems arise from our protocol: we have made a very strong assumption that Alice and Bob send and receive photons in only two possible bases. In reality we would have to deal with the fact that they can use very di erent quantum states and quantum measurements. It is indeed completely unknown to us if this protocol is safe under these general conditions. The main problem in quantum cryptography is to provide proofs for the security of cryptographic primitives assuming the most general quantum measurements an opponent could make. Nevertheless, the full security of the quantum bit commitment primitive has been obtained in 5] and quantum oblivious transfer has been shown secure against a large set of measurements 21]. Basing our identi cation scheme on such primitives gives more freedom on the codes while, at the same price, providing security against any quantum measurements. Oblivious transfer has already been used by 14] to solve the problem of identi cation. In the next section, we present a di erent solution based on quantum oblivious transfer and theorem 6.
The Final Protocol
No existing family of codes meets the four conditions above. One way around this problem is to drop condition 1. To do so we need a means of transferring elements of a larger eld GF(Q) at once. This is exactly the purpose of a 
Protocol
Suppose Alice and Bob share = A = B 2 R f0; 1g n . In order for Alice to prove to Bob that she knows , she transmits a random string c taken from a sparse but large set C, in such a way that if they agree on the same he receives c and veri es that it belongs to C, but otherwise receives a rather random string which is unlikely to be in C.
More precisely, let M be a random n k matrix over GF (4) . ( In banking applications, M is chosen by the bank and may be made public.) Let C n be the n;k n ;d n ] linear code over GF(4) generated by M. Let C ? n be the n;n?k n ;d 0 n ] linear code over GF (4) In the above protocol, in contrast to protocol 3.1, the randomization of step 3 is necessary because the ? 2 1 {OT 4 no longer provides the fact that a random element is obtained when i 6 = B i , and we do not want Alice to take advantage of that fact. From the previous sections it is now easy to see why the protocol is correct and secure. 
identOT ( ; B ) with a dishonest Alice
Suppose a malicious Alice (denoted by Alice ) tries to impersonate the real Alice. We assume that Alice knows almost nothing about B at the beginning. This section speci es code parameters that allow Bob to reject Alice with probability exponentially close to one. Now we show how to choose the parameter k of code in order to eliminate the chances that Alice identify as Alice successfully. Theorem 7. If d n 2 (n) Bob will reject Alice except with probability exponentially small in n.
proof sketch: Bob's nal calculation is u v (x; y) B ] which by de nition of v is u (r x;s y) B ] . Alice , who knows r;s;x;y may try to choose a u cleverly to make this a codeword for as many B as possible. We show this is not possible.
First notice that for any xed r;s, when x;y are uniformly chosen at random (r x;s y) 3n=4. By the assumption that Alice has almost no information about B we know that the number of equally likely candidates for B is roughly 2 n . Fix a u and a B and assume the corresponding word has syndrome S. We know that all the 0 that are di erent from B in the positions where r x and s y are the same will not change the result of the calculation. Therefore roughly 2 n=4 values of B will yield the same result with syndrome S.
On the other hand, any 0 that di er from B in positions where r x and s y are di erent will yield a di erent result. As long as the number of di erences is no more than d n =2 the resulting words cannot have the same syndrome because this would imply that the code contains a word of weight less than d n and no other word of syndrome S can be closer than the one we started from. Therefore
i possibilities for B will yield results of another syndrome and each of these is associated to a single word of syndrome S. n . Therefore the probability that Alice gets Bob to accept is no more than 2 ? n with = 3H( )=4.
u t We need to know more than just the fact that Alice will fail most of the time: we show that in the case of failure she cannot learn much about B .
Theorem8. If d n 2 (n) Alice learns almost nothing about B , except with probability exponentially small in n.
proof sketch: By the same counting argument as above, there cannot be more than 2 (1?3h( )=4)n possibilities of B that would yield codewords. When rejected, Alice 's only gain in knowledge is that the real B was not one of those. Thus she can eliminate only that many strings. u t The consequence of these theorems is that with probability 1 ? 2 ? n Alice will be rejected and in that case she may discard only 2 (1?3h( )=4)n strings as candidates for B . She will thus still have almost no information about B even after discarding poly(n) 2 (1?3h( )=4)n strings.
identOT ( A ; ) with a dishonest Bob
Now we analyze the situation from the point of view of an honest Alice facing a malicious Bob .
Theorem9. Except with exponentially small probability in n, Protocol identOT( ) hides all information about A to Bob if the code is a n;k n ;d n ]{code with a dual n;n ? k n ;d 0 n ]{code such that d 0 n ( 1 2 + )n for 0 < < 1 proof sketch: For each position i such that i = A i , Bob will get the codeword position c i of c. The #fij A i = i g is at most ( 1 2 + )n except with probability smaller than 2e ? 2 n . The remaining positions (j) of (x; y) B ] u v for j 6 = A j are not correlated with c j as long as r and s were originally chosen at random. Since the dual has minimum distance d 0 > ( 1 2 + )n we conclude that theorem 6 applies and that Protocol IdentOT hides the information A to Bob . u t Example: Codes with such properties exist over GF (4) . For instance, a random n 0:91n 4-ary matrix is likely to de ne a n;0:91n;0:02n] code with a n;0:09n;0:52n] dual code. Assymptoticaly, the probability that such a matrix do not de ne a code with these parameters is exponentially small in n. 
Complexity

Implementation Remarks
The protocol from the appendix uses quantum transmission both for Oblivious Transfer and Bit Commitment. At rst glance, it seems like the quantum transmission of data must go in both directions, since the Oblivious Transfer goes from Alice to Bob and the Bit Commitment goes the other way. As pointed out in 12], there is no need for photons traveling both ways. These two protocols may be implemented with the photons going in a single direction. It does not matter who send the photons to who, the same result can be achieved from them. (A similar idea was suggested by Hans-Joachim Knobloch 19] .) Because of the above remark, in a smartcard scenario it su ces to implement on the card the technology for sending polarized photons: a weak light source with a multiple polarizer system. As for the ATM it would have to use the more elaborate technology for making polarization measurements on the incoming photons. Since the distance between the sender and receiver could be of a few millimeters the actual error rate of the quantum transmission would be extremely low (error rates of 0.5% have been observed on hundreds of meters 22]).
Conclusion and Open Questions
We have presented a protocol for mutual identi cation based on the existence of an Oblivious Transfer and have shown improvements to the Quantum Oblivious Transfer in order to combine them in an e cient Quantum Mutual Identi cation Protocol. Here is a few open problems:
1. It would be interesting to show that the protocol of section 3 is secure even if the participants use arbitrarily complicated physics. 
